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1. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism still poses a real threat to air transport. The unsuccessful plot in the United 
Kingdom in August 2006, involving the use of liquid explosives smuggled in hand luggage to 
blow up several aircraft in flight, show – if proof were needed – that it would be foolhardy for 
the European Union to relax its efforts in the field of aviation security. It is still essential to 
ensure that the security measures adopted by the EU in Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002
1 are 
applied properly.  
In September 2005, the Commission adopted its first report
2 on the implementation of 
Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 covering the period February 2004-June 2005. This second 
report covers the period July 2005-December 2006 and is based more particularly on the 
conclusions drawn from some fifty new inspections carried out by the Commission. It enables 
a comprehensive evaluation to be made of the state of security in the European Union four 
years after the entry into force of the European legislation.  
This report confirms in particular that the introduction of Community rules has significantly 
improved security at EU airports. Air travellers enjoy a high level of security. The EU system 
has proven capable of maintaining and developing common rules which facilitate travel by 
minimising cumbersome variations of security rules between Member States.  
LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE COMMISSION'S INSPECTIONS IN 2005/2006 
Since February 2004 when inspections began, the Commission has carried out 89 inspections, 
including 47 new inspections conducted between July 2005 and December 2006 in EU-25 and 
Switzerland
3 (see Annex 1). To date, all Member States have been inspected between two and 
five times, with visits either to the national appropriate authorities for civil aviation security or 
to airports themselves
4.  
2.1. Inspections  of  national appropriate authorities 
It is now possible to provide a full picture of how all Member States fulfil their quality control 
obligations since the 10 national authorities of the new Member States, which had not been 
                                                 
1  Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 
establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security. OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p. 1. 
2  COM(2005) 428 of 22 September 2005. First report on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 
2320/2002 on civil aviation security. 
3  The Commission has powers to conduct inspections in Switzerland under a bilateral EU-Switzerland 
agreement. A total of 11 inspections similar to those conducted by the Commission have also been 
carried out in Norway and Iceland by the EFTA Surveillance Authority. 
4  Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU on 1 January 2007, will be inspected for the first time in 
2007.  
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inspected when the first report was drawn up, have now been inspected
5. The initial 
conclusions drawn in 2005 can be confirmed: while transposition of the regulatory obligations 
is more or less satisfactory, the effectiveness of the Member States' national quality control is 
not. 
2.1.1.  Transposition of regulatory obligations in national regulations 
The national civil aviation security authorities are inspected to check that regulatory 
obligations have been properly transposed in national regulations, in other words that a 
Member State's national civil aviation security programme
6, its national quality control 
programme
7, its airports' and air carriers' security programmes
8 and its national training 
programme
9 properly comply with European legislation. The inspections have in particular 
revealed that: 
–  the national civil aviation security programmes, some of whose provisions have 
occasionally needed adjusting, should be regularly brought into line with the new 
Community requirements arising from the amendment of Regulation No 622/2003; 
–  the overall contents of the national control programmes conform to Community 
requirements in legal terms; 
–  requirements regarding the common methodology to be used for national audits (whether 
or not unannounced, diversity of audits, classification of results) are properly provided for 
in most Member States; 
–  the airports' security programmes are being satisfactorily validated; most of the 
programmes examined by the Commission's inspectors have been revised following the 
entry into force of the new European legislation; 
–  the airlines' security programmes are not being uniformly monitored by all Member States 
and priority is going to companies whose licence is issued by the State concerned; 
–  the development and implementation of national security training programmes are 
generally satisfactory. 
2.1.2.  Effectiveness of national quality control 
However, the operational implementation of national quality programmes has been found to 
have numerous deficiencies which are often considered by inspectors to be serious; the 
effectiveness of national quality control is at present structurally inadequate in ten or so 
Member States. 
                                                 
5  Luxembourg has not been the subject of an inspection by the national authority as it has no national 
quality control programme; infringement proceedings has therefore been initiated. 
6  Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002. 
7  Article 5(3) and Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1217/2003 of 4 July 2003 laying down common specifications for national civil aviation security 
control programmes, OJ L 169, 8.07.03, p.44. 
8  Article 5(4) of Regulation No 2320/2002. 
9  Article 5(5) of Regulation No 2320/2002.  
EN  4     EN 
–  In many Member States, audits are neither regular enough nor comprehensive enough to 
respond to the challenge of security on the ground, to encourage operators to apply 
procedures in full and to give an objective and complete view of the situation at national 
level. Some national authorities do not use the powers they have been granted to vary the 
audit methods used (security audits, inspections, tests, follow-up actions).  
–  Many of the Member States do not have enough national inspectors to carry out quality 
control tasks with adequate frequency
10; too many inspectors, for example, are assigned for 
a significant part of their working time to other tasks, in particular regulatory issues. This 
has a direct adverse impact in terms of the level of compliance, the number of audits and 
areas covered, and the risk that auditors will have little experience. 
–  The performance of the rectification process, i.e. the speed at which deficiencies found are 
required to be put right, varies. In most Member States, the implementing powers 
conferred on the national authority are not applied with adequate force. In some Member 
States, sanctions are imposed only in exceptional circumstances, even when no 
rectifications are made. This weakness is paralleled by the insufficient number of follow-
up inspections on the ground. 
This finding obviously has an impact on the level of compliance found during Commission 
inspections at airports. 
2.2.  Inspections at airports  
2.2.1. A  representative  sample 
Since February 2004, the Commission has carried out 65 airport inspections in all the 
Member States and Switzerland. These inspections took place in 49 different airports, 
corresponding to about 10% of the 500 or so airports which have commercial traffic. 16 of 
these initial inspections led to follow-up inspections to check that deficiencies previously 
identified had been rectified. During the period July 2005-December 2006, 36 new airport 
inspections were carried out (generally airports which play a key role in the airport system of 
the Member States concerned), 13 of them being follow-ups. This sample is clearly small in 
total, but it is in keeping with the plan for Community quality control of the Member States, 
as provided for in Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002. 
To conduct these inspections, the Commission had ten or so full-time inspectors at its 
disposal, but it could also call upon the services of national auditors who were made available 
on specific occasions
11. 
2.2.2.  Overview of deficiencies found 
The results of the 23 new initial inspections carried out since July 2005 confirm the main 
points highlighted in the Commission's first report. In overall terms, the level of security in 
the European Union is high. This is because the European legislation in several areas is more 
demanding and more detailed than the international regulations laid down by the International 
                                                 
10  Broadly speaking, there are today about 350 national security inspectors (full-time and part-time) drawn 
from the competent national authorities (EUR 25). 
11  On the basis of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1217/2003, some 70 national auditors are now 
qualified to take part in one-off Commission inspections. During the period July 2005-December 2006, 
58 national auditors were thus able to take part in initial inspections; during the period February 2004-
June 2005, the number was 32.  
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Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
12. However, the level of security is not uniform 
throughout the Union as there are substantial differences between airports: Europe is therefore 
not totally protected against threats. The basic principles, such as 100% screening of 
passengers, hand luggage and hold luggage, are being soundly applied. 
The inspections carried out in 2006 also confirm that the trend towards improvement has 
continued: overall, the cases of non-compliance observed fell by 21 % and their seriousness 
by 17% compared with 2004
13. However, measures are not always applied in compliance with 
the European legislation and deficiencies are still regularly found which compromise the 
general quality of the security measures. It is therefore a question of doing better rather than 
more.  
–  Recurring deficiencies of minor or average seriousness were found in respect of essential 
procedures concerning access control, aircraft protection, the screening of passenger and 
the protection of hold luggage. 
–  The cases of non-compliance with European regulations are often more serous as regards 
the screening of staff, aircraft searches, and the screening of hand luggage and cargo. 
Within the same airport, for example, identical procedures might not be used for the 
screening of staff and passengers, the methods applied to staff being more flexible and not 
allowing the systematic detection of prohibited articles.  
–  The tests carried out during inspections confirm the need for technical harmonisation of 
security equipment; this process has been initiated and 2 regulations have been approved 
(see section 3.1). 
–  Lastly, some operators find the regulations unclear, and further provisions have been 
drafted in this respect too (see section 3.2). 
There are several reasons for these deficiencies: the human factor clearly explains many of the 
cases of non-compliance, e.g. failure to detect prohibited articles when cabin baggage is 
subjected to X-ray examination. Continuous supervision, training and raising of awareness 
about the terrorist threat is therefore needed. The need to carry out the various security checks 
in a minimum of time and the fast pace of aircraft rotations, which are also major operational 
constraints, also explain many of the deficiencies. Finally, some of the deficiencies are 
directly attributable to the inadequacy and sometimes the simple lack of national quality 
control since the European legislation entered into force, given that effective quality control 
does require checks on the ground. 
2.2.3. Seriousness  of  deficiencies and activation of Article 15 of Regulation No 1486/2003 
The seriousness of the deficiencies found must not be underestimated: nine initial inspections 
out of ten are still pointing to serious deficiencies which have repercussions on the security 
chain. Given the principle of one-stop security which underpins Regulation No 2320/2002, 
the deficiencies are often likely to have a direct negative impact on security at other European 
Union airports. 
                                                 
12  Annex 17 to the Montreal Convention. 
13  These statistics take account of the security areas listed in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002.  
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This is why, in accordance with the rules
14, the Commission requires the Member States 
concerned to rectify the situation immediately if the seriousness of a deficiency warrants this. 
If deficiencies are not rectified immediately, all other Member States have to take 
compensatory measures, often costly ones, at their airports. Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 
1486/2003 has thus been activated by the Commission on 17 occasions since 2004, but only 4 
of these were during the period covered by this report. This confirms that the Member States 
are now more willing to rectify the most serious deficiencies as quickly as possible once they 
have been detected. This is a major achievement. 
2.2.4.  Follow-up inspections and rectification process 
As noted in the 2005 report, it is pleasing to see that the Member States welcome the 
Commission's inspection reports. With a view to measuring the performance of the process of 
rectifying cases of non-compliance found during inspections, this being the last phase of each 
inspection, the Commission carried out 13 follow-up inspections in 13 Member States during 
the eighteen-month period covered by this report. These inspections allow the following 
conclusions to be drawn: 
–  the level of rectification is far too low: Member States announce that rectifications 
requested by the Commission have been made and national audits are carried out, but it is 
often found that only some of the serious deficiencies have actually been rectified in a 
satisfactory manner; 
–  the security measures that most difficult to rectify are often those relating to the screening 
of staff and aircraft security; 
–  the average time taken to rectify deficiencies is quite long, at just over one year; sometimes 
this period is much shorter, though, often reflecting the determination shown by the 
competent national authority and the operators concerned. 
If the rectification process is found to be unsatisfactory (level of compliance too low, 
rectification period too long), it is only right, once all other means have been exhausted, that 
the Commission should initiate infringement proceedings against the Member State 
concerned. The Commission had to take such action twice in 2005 and 2006 to prompt the 
national appropriate authorities concerned to use the implementing powers at their disposal 
under their national quality control programmes
15. 
3. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2006 
Article 4(2) of Regulation 2320/2002
16 provides that the Commission shall adopt the 
necessary measures for the implementation and technical adaptation of the common basic 
standards laid down in the annex to that regulation in accordance with the comitology 
procedure provided in Article 5 of Council Decision 1999/468/EEC
17 (Regulatory Committee 
procedure). The Commission is assisted by a Committee of representatives of the Member 
                                                 
14  Article 15 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1486/2003 of 22 August 2003 laying down procedures 
for conducting Commission inspections in the field of civil aviation security states that "if an inspection 
discloses a serious deficiency which is deemed to have significant impact on the overall level of civil 
aviation security in the Community, the Commission shall immediately inform the appropriate 
authorities". OJ L 213, 23.08.2003, p.3. 
15  Proceedings initiated against Luxembourg and Finland. 
16  OJ L355, 30.12.2002, p.1. 
17  OJ L184, 17.7.1999, p.23.  
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States established under Article 9 of Regulation 2320/2002. This procedure allows measures 
to be taken swiftly as and when needs arise. 
This Committee met on 12 occasions between July 2005 and December 2006, assisting the 
Commission in preparing aviation security legislation. During 2006 in the course of its work 
the Committee gave favourable opinions on the adoption by the Commission of six 
implementing regulations. As part of the adoption process, the European Parliament was 
informed in accordance with the requirements of Article 7 of Council Decision 
1999/486/EC
18. 
3.1.  Standards for all major types of security equipment 
Two regulations were part of the Commission’s on-going work to include in Regulation 
622/2003 performance standards for all major types of security equipment used at EU 
airports. Such requirements will ensure a baseline standard for such equipment in use 
throughout the EU and contribute to improving the results of tests carried out during 
inspections. 
–  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1448/2006
19, which was adopted on 29 September 2006 
and came into force on 20 October 2006, lays down performance standards for explosive 
detection systems (EDS) used at Community airports. 
–  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1862/2006
20, which was adopted on 15 December 2006 
and came into force on 5 January 2007, lays down performance standards for walk-through 
metal detectors (WTMDs) used at Community airports. 
3.2.  Gaps in the existing legislation highlighted by Commission inspections 
Two regulations stemmed in part from the results of Commission inspections highlighting 
deficiencies or weaknesses in the existing legislation. In this regard feedback from 
Commission inspectors and analysis of inspection results by the Commission has highlighted 
the need for more precise requirements in a number of cases. 
–  Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/2006
21, adopted on 10 February and which came 
into force on 3 March 2006, gives greater precision on security procedures for those 
vehicles that are entering ‘security restricted areas’ of airports; 
–  Commission Regulation (EC) No 831/2006
22, which was adopted on 2 June 2006 and came 
into force on 1 January 2007, lays down more harmonised rules on air cargo security.  
3.3.  Technological development in the field of aviation security 
Technological developments in the field of aviation security should not be hindered by the 
Community legal requirements. A regulatory solution was instigated at the wishes of industry, 
with the full support of the Commission and the Member States. Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 65/2006
23 allows, under defined conditions, for Member States to deviate from the 
technical standards laid down in the legislation in order to trial new technologies. Such trials 
                                                 
18  OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p.23. 
19  OJ L271, 30.09.2006, p.31. 
20  OJ L358, 16.12.2006, p.36. 
21  OJ L40, 11.2.2006, p.3. 
22  OJ L150, 3.6.2006, p.4. 
23  OJ L11, 17.1.2006, p.4.  
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would be permitted for an absolute maximum of 30 months, after which a decision should be 
taken whether or not to incorporate the new technology into Community law as an accepted 
security method. 
3.4.  Risk of liquid explosives 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1546/2006
24, which was adopted on 4 October 2006 and 
came into force on 6 November 2006, arose from the events of 10 August 2006 in the United 
Kingdom. On that date, the UK intelligence services detected a plan by terrorists to blow up 
several aircraft during flight using liquid explosives that were home-made from household 
chemicals. 
The Commission's services then consulted with Europe's leading technical and scientific 
experts in aviation security on how best to address the threat. Dialogue took place with the 
Member States and the stakeholder associations representing airports, airlines and airport 
retailers in order to minimise the negative effects that any new rulemaking on this subject 
could have on air travel in the Community. Of particular concern was the absence on the 
market of any form of proven equipment/technology that could swiftly and accurately analyse 
the contents of a sealed bottle for liquid explosives. This Regulation, which limits the 
individual quantities of liquids allowed to be carried by passengers to 100 ml per container 
and requires that the number of containers fit in one transparent re-sealable plastic bag of a 
maximum size of 1 litre, should be reviewed every 6 months in the light of technical 
developments, operational implications at airports and the impact on passengers. 
Studies on the creation of an air cargo database for known consigners, the use of sniffer dogs 
and a 'trusted traveller' concept have also been launched by the Commission in order to 
undertake preparatory technical work. 
4. ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE  
In 2007, several lines of action in particular should be pursued: 
–  Action to strengthen the performance of quality control by the appropriate authorities of 
the Member States 
Member States' performance of quality control has so far been identified as the weak link in 
the civil aviation security chain. Strengthening it should therefore have a lever effect. It is in 
particular essential that Member States carry out quality control in line with Community 
requirements and make the lessons drawn known at all their airports. This means combining 
the mobilisation of human resources in the form of the inspectors needed with the use of 
adequate implementing powers. Cooperation between Member States on auditing with a view 
to the regular evaluation of operators with business activities throughout the EU should also 
be encouraged. The Commission for its part will continue to conduct inspections and 
infringement proceedings will be brought where necessary. 
–  Actions to improve the present regulatory framework 
In order to strengthen the complementarity between Community and national audits, 
Regulations (EC) Nos 1486/2003 and 1217/2003 should be revised. Requirements regarding 
                                                 
24  OJ L286, 17.10.2006, p.6.  
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national audit procedures, the rectification of deficiencies and the proportionality of quality 
control with the national airport system will have to be defined more clearly. 
Secondly, given the importance of the human factor for the quality of the security control 
process, the Commission is examining proposals for improving training requirements for 
security staff. 
Finally it is the Commission’s intention that Regulation (EC) No 622/2003 should be 
developed further on a regular basis in order to revise security requirements either whenever 
technical developments or the need for additional precision at the Community level justifies 
it. 
More generally, the Commission intends to re-assess the continued necessity of the range of 
regulatory requirements in the field of aviation security based on operational experience and 
on updated risk assessments. Successive incidents over past years have necessitated 
emergency action to respond to immediate threats, putting considerable strains on available 
security control resources and on operational requirements at airport level. It is clear, 
however, that reviewing and subsequently removing or redefining some of the current 
requirements will necessitate prior adoption of the Commission's proposal for a new, 
simplified and more flexible framework Regulation which is currently in the legislative 
process. 
There would be considerable potential for operational facilitation if ways could be found to 
extend the intra-EU concept of one-stop security to like-minded third countries with 
equivalent high standards of security. The Commission is actively working on this concept 
and is expecting first results in due course following adoption of the new framework 
Regulation.  
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Annex 1. Commission inspections by Member State on 31.12.2006 
Member State  Number of inspections 
2004 - 06/2005 
(including follow-ups) 
Number of inspections 
07/2005 - 12/2006 
(including follow-ups) 
Total number of inspections
2004/2006 
(including follow-ups) 
Belgium  2 1 3 
Czech Republic  1 1 2 
Denmark  2 2 4 
Germany  3 3 6 
Estonia  - 2 2 
Greece  3 3 6 
Spain  3 1 4 
France  3 3 6 
Ireland  2 2 4 
Italy  2 3 5 
Cyprus  1 2 3 
Latvia  1 2 3 
Lithuania  1 2 3 
Luxembourg  2 - 2 
Hungary  1 1 2 
Malta  1 1 2 
Netherlands  2 1 3 
Austria  3 2 5 
Poland  1 3 4 
Portugal  2 1 3 
Slovenia  1 2 3 
Slovakia  - 2 2 
Finland  1 3 4 
Sweden  2 1 3 
United Kingdom  2 2 4 
Switzerland -  1  1 
TOTAL: 42*  47*  89 
* These data do not take account of the two technical evaluations which took place in Bulgaria and Romania one after the 
other as part of the preparation of these countries' accession to the European Union on 1 January 2007. 